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Abstract
We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model
where …rms activate R&D investments for process innovation. We establish
that (i) …rms always choose the Cournot behaviour; and (ii) there exists
a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers
quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of
R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively
high. In this situation, the con‡ict between social and private preferences
over the type of market behaviour disappears.
J.E.L. classi…cation: L13, O31
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1 Introduction
The interplay between technological choices and market behaviour in oligopoly
models has been studied along two main routes. The …rst has emphasized
the link between the kind of competition prevailing on the market and …rms’
incentives to invest either in process or in product innovation. The second
concerns the in‡uence of capacity constraints on market equilibrium.
Most literature on R&D races in oligopoly deals with the evaluation of
incentives to undertake cost reducing investments as the number of …rms
changes. This Schumpeterian approach holds that a major factor determining
the pace of technological progress is market structure (amongst the countless
contributions in this vein, see Arrow, 1962; Loury; 1979; Lee and Wilde, 1980;
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Delbono and Denicolò, 1991; for an overview
see Reinganum, 1989).
An established result on cost reducing investment in oligopolistic markets
under perfect certainty states that there is excess expenditure in R&D un-
der Cournot competition, and conversely under Bertrand competition, due
to the opposite slopes of reaction functions at the market stage (Brander
and Spencer, 1983; Dixon, 1985). With di¤erentiated products, Bester and
Petrakis (1993) maintain that the incentive to invest in cost reducing in-
novation depends upon the degree of product substitutability. Under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition, underinvestment, as compared to the so-
cial optimum, obtains when products are fairly imperfect substitutes, while
the opposite may occur when products are su¢ciently similar. Cournot com-
petition provides a lower (respectively, higher) incentive to innovate than
Bertrand competition if substitutability is high (respectively, low). Social
welfare may then be higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition
(Delbono and Denicolò, 1990; Qiu, 1997).
Singh and Vives (1984) investigate the choice of the market variable in a
duopoly where …rms operate costlessly. They …nd that, independently of the
degree of product substitutability, …rms choose to be quantity setters at the
subgame perfect equilibrium, while social welfare would be higher under price
setting behaviour. The opposite holds if products are demand complements.
In this paper, we extend Qiu’s analysis to account for the asymmetric
case where one …rm is a quantity setter while the other is a price setter, and
we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game where …rms
operate R&D activities aimed at reducing marginal production costs and
then compete at the marketing stage. Then, we recast Singh and Vives’s
analysis in a three-stage game where …rms choose whether to be price or
quantity setters at the …rst stage, then invest in cost-reducing R&D, and
…nally compete on the market. We establish that, at the subgame perfect
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equilibrium, …rms always choose to set quantities. However, we also …nd
that there exists a parameter region where quantity setting behaviour is
socially preferable, if marginal R&D costs are su¢ciently low and spillover
are su¢ciently high. In such a situation, we have a second best equilibrium
where the usual con‡ict over the choice of the market variable disappears.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The setup is laid
out in section 2. Section 3 describes R&D and market behaviour. Private
and social preferences concerning the choice of the market variable are then
investigated in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The setup
The demand side is a simpli…ed version of Bowley (1924), subsequently
adopted by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), inter
alia. Assume the representative consumer is characterised by the following
utility function:
U (qiqj) = qi + qj ¡ 1
2
³
q2i + q
2
j + 2°qiqj
´
(1)
where qi and qj are the quantities of goods i and j; respectively. The resulting
(symmetric) demand functions under Cournot and Bertrand competition are,
respectively
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj (2)
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ pi
1¡ °2 +
°pj
1¡ °2 (3)
In the asymmetric case, where …rm i is a quantity setter, while …rm j is a
price setter, demand functions are:
pi = 1¡ qi + °(pj + °qi ¡ 1) (4)
qj = 1¡ pj ¡ °qi (5)
Parameter ° 2 (0; 1] represents product substitutability as perceived by con-
sumers, depending upon the products …rms supply. If one supposes that
marginal costs are constant and equal to c across …rms, then individual prof-
its are ¼IJi = (pi ¡ c) qi; where IJ 2 fPP;QQ; PQ;QPg indicates that, at
the market stage, …rm i sets variable I while …rm j sets variable J . In this
case, the choice between price and quantity behaviour is summarised by the
reduced form represented in Matrix 1.
2
j
P Q
i P ¼PPi ; ¼
PP
j ¼
PQ
i ; ¼
QP
j
Q ¼QPi ; ¼
PQ
j ¼
QQ
i ; ¼
QQ
j
Matrix 1
On the basis of Matrix 1, Singh and Vives (1984) conclude that quantity
setting (resp., price setting) is the dominant strategy (at least weakly) if
goods are demand substitutes (resp., complements). As a consequence, …rms
play a Cournot (resp., Bertrand) equilibrium for all ° 2 (0; 1] (resp., ° 2
[¡1; 0)).
In the remainder, given the symmetry of the model w.r.t. parameter °;
we will focus on the case of substitutes. Singh and Vives’s result entails that
there exists a con‡ict between …rms’ pro…t incentives and the social incentive
towards welfare maximization, which requires price setting behaviour when
goods are substitutes.
If we abandon the assumption of homogeneous costs, the choice between
price and quantity is driven by the sign of the following expressions:
¼QPi (ci; cj)¡ ¼PPi (ci; cj) (6)
¼QQi (ci; cj) ¡ ¼PQi (ci; cj) (7)
Now observe that, relabelling 1 ¡ ci ´ ®i ; the di¤erence in productive e¢-
ciency across …rms is formally equivalent to a di¤erence in reservation prices
for goods i and j in the representative consumer’s preferences (see Häckner,
2000), which would now write as follows:
U (qiqj) = ®iqi + ®jqj ¡ 1
2
³
q2i + q
2
j + 2°qiqj
´
Hence, as proved by Singh and Vives (1984), fQ;Qg is the unique equilibrium
outcome.
Given that …rms are ex ante symmetric, we need an explanation to justify
any asymmetry in marginal costs. The reason for such an asymmetry can be
found in the di¤erent incentives towards R&D investment that …rms have in
the four subgames fPP;QQ; PQ;QPg :
Suppose …rms play a non-cooperative two-stage game, where the …rst
stage involves choosing the individually optimal amount of R&D for process
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innovation, while the second is for marketing. De…ne as xi the R&D e¤ort
produced by …rm i: The R&D technology is the same across …rms. The cost
of R&D activity is Ki = f (xi) ; with f 0 (xi) ´ @f (xi) =@xi > 0 and f 00 (xi) ´
@2f (xi) =@x2i > 0: That is, we suppose that R&D activity is characterised by
decreasing returns to scale. The resulting marginal cost is ci ´ ci (xi ; µxj) ;
where µ 2 [0; 1] denotes the spillover received from …rm j’s R&D investment.
The net pro…ts accruing to …rm i; when the market subgame is IJ; are
ªIJi = ¼
IJ
i
h
ci
³
xIJi ; µx
JI
j
´
; cj
³
xJIj ; µx
IJ
i
´i
¡ f
³
xIJi
´
(8)
In this situation, the reduced form of the game is as in Matrix 2.
j
P Q
i P ªPPi ; ª
PP
j ª
PQ
i ; ª
QP
j
Q ªQPi ; ª
PQ
j ª
QQ
i ; ª
QQ
j
Matrix 2
Hence, the choice between P and Q is made according to the sign of:
¼QPi [ci (¢; ¢) ; cj (¢; ¢)]¡ ¼PPi [ci (¢; ¢) ; cj (¢; ¢)]¡ f
³
xQPi
´
+ f
³
xPPi
´
(9)
¼QQi [ci (¢; ¢) ; cj (¢; ¢)]¡ ¼PQi [ci (¢; ¢) ; cj (¢; ¢)]¡ f
³
xQQi
´
+ f
³
xPQi
´
(10)
The additional task consists in reassessing social preferences over the choice
of market variables in this new setting. A priori, one cannot presume that the
con‡ict between social and private incentives that characterises the previous
setting extends to this case. Indeed, we know from Qiu (1997) that there are
situations where social welfare is higher at the Cournot equilibrium than at
the Bertrand equilibrium.
In order to carry out the analysis of this problem, we model the R&D
stage as in Qiu (1997), by assuming that
ci = c¡ xi ¡ µxj ; c 2 (0; 1) (11)
Ki =
ºx2i
2
(12)
Firms play a non-cooperative three-stage game. At the …rst stage, they
choose between price and quantity. The following two stages describe (i) the
choice of R&D e¤orts and (ii) marketing. As usual, we proceed by backward
induction, using subgame perfection as the solution concept.
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3 R&D and market subgames
We borrow from Qiu (1997) the characterisation of subgames fPP;QQg ; i.e.,
Bertrand and Cournot.
3.1 Symmetric subgames
Bertrand equilibrium prices are:
pPPi =
(2 + °) (1¡ ° + c)¡ (2 + µ°)xi ¡ (2µ + °) xj
4¡ °2 (13)
The associated pro…ts are:
ªPPi =
[(1¡ c) (°2 + ° ¡ 2)¡ (2¡ µ° ¡ °2)xi + (° ¡ 2µ + µ°2) xj ]2
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡ °6 ¡
ºx2i
2
(14)
Solving the R&D stage, one obtains:
xPP =
2 (1¡ c) (2¡ µ° ¡ °2)
¢PP
(15)
¢PP = º (1 + °) (2¡ °)
³
4¡ °2
´
¡ 2 (1 + µ)
³
2¡ µ° ¡ °2
´
(16)
The resulting per-…rm equilibrium quantity is
qPP =
º (1¡ c) (4¡ °2)
¢PP
(17)
Consumer surplus is
CSPP = (1 + °)
"
º (1¡ c) (4¡ °2)
¢PP
#2
(18)
so that social welfare is
SW PP =
X
i
ªPPi + CS
PP = (19)
=
º (1¡ c)2
h
º (3 + ° ¡ 2°2) (4¡ °2)2 ¡ 4 (2¡ µ° ¡ °2)2
i
(¢PP )2
The following holds:
Lemma 1 (Qiu, 1997, p. 217) The condition º > 1=c is
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i] su¢cient but not necessary for ¢PP > 0; for all µ and ° (stability)
ii] necessary and su¢cient for post-innovation costs to be positive, i.e., cPP =
c¡ (1 + µ)xPP > 0
iii] su¢cient to ensure @2ªPPi =@x2i < 0 i¤ µ = 1
If instead µ 6= 1;
@2ªPPi
@x2i
< 0 , º > 2 (2¡ µ° ¡ °
2)
2
(1¡ °2) (4¡ °2)2
Examine now the Cournot case. The equilibrium output is
qQQi =
(1¡ c) (2¡ °) + (2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °)xj
4¡ °2 (20)
The associated pro…ts are:
ªQQi =
[(1¡ c) (2¡ °) + (2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °) xj ]2
(4¡ °2)2 ¡
ºx2i
2
(21)
Proceeding backward to solve the R&D stage, one obtains:
xQQ =
2 (1¡ c) (2¡ µ°)
¢QQ
(22)
¢QQ = º (2 + °)
³
4¡ °2
´
¡ 2 (1 + µ) (2¡ µ°) (23)
The resulting per-…rm equilibrium quantity is
qQQ =
º (1¡ c) (4¡ °2)
¢QQ
(24)
The resulting consumer surplus is
CSPP = (1 + °)
"
º (1¡ c) (4¡ °2)
¢QQ
#2
(25)
so that social welfare is
SWQQ =
X
i
ªQQi + CS
QQ = (26)
=
º (1¡ c)2
h
º (3 + °) (4¡ °2)2 ¡ 4 (2¡ µ°)2
i
(¢QQ)2
The following holds:
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Lemma 2 (Qiu, 1997, p. 216) The condition º > 1=c is
i] su¢cient but not necessary for
¢QQ > 0 (stability)
@2ªQQi
@x2i
< 0 (concavity)
for all µ and °
ii] necessary and su¢cient for post-innovation costs to be positive, i.e., cQQ =
c¡ (1 + µ)xQQ > 0
3.2 The asymmetric subgames
Cases QP and PQ are symmetric up to a permutation of …rms. Therefore,
we con…ne our attention to the situation where …rm i is a quantity-setter,
while …rm j is a price-setter. The demand functions are (4) and (5). The
Nash equilibrium at the market stage is given by:
qQPi =
(2¡ °) (1¡ c) + (2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °)xj
4¡ 3°2 (27)
pPQj =
1¡ c¡ µxi ¡ xj
4
+ (28)
¡° [(2¡ °) (1¡ c) + (2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °)xj]
4¡ 3°2
The associated pro…ts are:
ªQPi =
(1¡ °2) [(1¡ c) (2¡ °) + (2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °) xj ]2
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡
ºx2i
2
(29)
ªPQj =
[(1¡ c) (°2 + ° ¡ 2)¡ (µ°2 + ° ¡ 2)xi + (°2 + µ° ¡ 2)xj]2
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡
ºx2j
2
(30)
At the …rst stage, …rms non-cooperatively maximise their respective pro…ts
w.r.t. R&D e¤ort levels, solving:
@ªQPi
@xi
=
2 (1¡ °2) (2¡ µ°) (1¡ c) (2¡ °)
(4¡ 3°2)2 + (31)
+
2 (1¡ °2) (2¡ µ°) [(2¡ µ°)xi + (2µ ¡ °)xj]
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡ ºxi = 0
7
@ªPQj
@xj
=
2 (µ°2 + ° ¡ 2) (1¡ c) (°2 + ° ¡ 2)
(4¡ 3°2)2 + (32)
¡
2 (µ°2 + ° ¡ 2)
h
(µ°2 + ° ¡ 2)xi + (°2 + µ° ¡ 2)x2j
i
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡ ºxj = 0
whose solution yields the equilibrium R&D investments:
xQPi =
2 (1¡ c) (1¡ °2) (µ° ¡ 2)®i
¢xQP
(33)
xPQj =
2 (1¡ c) (1¡ °) (4¡ 3°2) (°2 + µ° ¡ 2)®j
¢xPQ
(34)
where:
®i = 2 (1¡ µ)
³
°2 + µ° ¡ 2
´
+ º (2¡ °)
³
4¡ 3°2
´
®j = 2 (1¡ µ)
³
2¡ µ°2
´
+ 2
³
2¡ 3µ + µ2
´
° ¡ º (2 + °)
³
4¡ 3°2
´
¢xQP =
³
µ2 ¡ 1
´ h
5
³
4¡ °2
´
µ°3 + 16 (1¡ µ°)
i
+4
h
2
³
3¡ °2
´
¡ (7¡ 3°) µ2
i
°2+
+º
h
16
³
4¡ 7°2
´
+ 2
³
28¡ 3°2
´
°4 ¡ 32
³
2¡ 3°2
´
µ° ¡ 6 (6¡ °) µ°5+
+4
³
4¡ 5°2
´
µ2°2 ¡ 16
³
4¡ 9°2
´
º ¡ 27
³
4¡ °2
´
°2
i
¢xPQ = 4
³
°2 ¡ 1
´
(° ¡ 2µ) (2¡ µ°)
³
°2 + µ° ¡ 2
´ ³
° ¡ 2µ + µ°2
´
+
+
·
2
³
1¡ °2
´
(4¡ µ°)2 ¡ º
³
4¡ 3°2
´2¸ h
2
³
4
³
1¡ °2 ¡ µ°
´
+ (° + µ)2 °2
´
+
¡º
³
4¡ 3°2
´2¸
The equilibrium output levels are:1
qQPi =
(1¡ c) (3°2 ¡ 4) [2 (1¡ µ) (°2 + µ° ¡ 2) + º (2¡ °) (4¡ 3°2)]
¢xQP
(35)
qPQj =
(1¡ c) (1¡ °) (4¡ 3°2) º [2 (1¡ µ) (2¡ µ°2) +
¢xPQ
(36)
+2
³
2¡ 3µ + µ2
´
° ¡ º (2 + °) (4¡ 3°2)
i
¢xPQ
1For the sake of brevity, we omit the expressions of equilibrium prices, which are avail-
able upon request.
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The corresponding equilibrium pro…ts are:
ªQPi =
(1¡ c)2 (°2 ¡ 1) º [2 (1¡ µ) (°2 + µ° ¡ 2) + º (2¡ °) (4¡ 3°2)]2 [2 (1+
(¢xQP )
2
(37)
¡°2) (2¡ µ°)2 ¡ º (4¡ 3°2)
i
(¢xQP )
2
ªPQj =
(1¡ c)2 (1¡ °) º
h
2 (1¡ µ) (2¡ µ°2) + 2
³
2¡ 3µ + µ2
´
° ¡ º (2+
(¢xPQ)
2
(38)
+°) (4¡ 3°2)]2
h
8 (1¡ °2 ¡ µ°) + 2 (° + µ)2 °2 ¡ º (4¡ 3°2)
i
(¢xPQ)
2
On the basis of the above expressions, we cannot derive analytically the equiv-
alent of Lemmata 1-2 for the asymmetric case. Therefore, we must rely upon
numerical calculations to ensure that (i) concavity and stability conditions
are satis…ed; and (ii) post-innovation marginal costs are non-negative.
However, on the basis of (33-34), the following holds:
Lemma 3 Given acceptable values of fc ; ° ; µ ; ºg ; we have that xQPi >
xPQj : Moreover, given acceptable values of fc ; µ ; ºg ; there exists b° 2 (0 ; 1) ;
such that
n
xPQj = 0 ; c
PQ
j = c
o
:
That is, the quantity-setter invests more than the price setter, and the
latter does not invest at all to reduce her own marginal cost, if product
substitutability is larger than a critical threshold. The general behaviour of
cQPi and c
PQ
j for ° 2 [0 ; 1] is described in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 : Marginal costs and product substitutability
6
-0
ci; cj
b° 1 °
c
cPQj
cQPi
First of all, notice that, as substitutability increases, the marginal cost
of the price-setter becomes increasingly larger than the marginal cost borne
by the quantity-setter, for all ° 2 [0 ; b°).2 This re‡ects the higher incentive
towards investment in process innovation for the quantity-setter compared to
the price-setter, in line with previous …ndings by Brander and Spencer (1983),
Dixon (1985), Bester and Petrakis (1993). Moreover, at ° = b° we have that
cPQj = c and, therefore, the price-setter stops investing in R&D. That is, for
° ¸ b° ; we set xPQj = 0 and recalculate xQPi from (31). This reveals that
the quantity setting …rm reduces her investment in R&D in response to the
fact that the price setting rival is not investing at all. As a consequence,
cQPi increases in the degree of product substitutability, for all ° 2 [b° ; 1] :
When ° = 1; i.e., products are homogeneous, also the quantity-setter stops
investing and both …rms operate at c:
In general, the solution to …rm i’s investment problem, when …rm j does
2For example, when
c =
3
4
; º = 1:34 ; ° 2 [0 ; 1] ; µ = 1
100
;
concavity and stability conditions are met and we have b° = 0:83622:
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not invest is given by:
xQPi
³
xPQj = 0
´
=
2 (1¡ °2) (°µ ¡ 2) (1¡ c) (2¡ °)
2 (1¡ °2) (2¡ °µ)2 ¡ º (4¡ 3°2)2 (39)
Finally, social welfare in the asymmetric case is:
SW PQ = SWQP =
X
i
ªIJi + CS
IJ (40)
where CSIJ = (1 + °)
³
qIJi + q
JI
j
´2
=4:
4 The …rst stage: private vs social prefer-
ences
Equilibrium pro…ts ªPP , ªQQ, ªPQ and ªQP can be plugged into Matrix 2
to yield the reduced form of the …rst stage of the game, where …rms non-
cooperatively choose whether to be price- or quantity-setters.
We obtain the following:
Claim 1 For all admissible values of parameters fc ; ° ; µ ; ºg ; we have that
Q º P : Hence, the Cournot equilibrium is unique and results from (at
least weakly) dominant strategies.
Explicit calculations over the relevant inequalities, i.e.:
ªQQ ¡ªPQ > 0 (41)
ªQP ¡ªPP > 0 (42)
are omitted for the sake of brevity. Verifying that (41-42) hold for all positiven
xIJi
o
is a matter of simple albeit tedious algebra.3 Having done that, the
extension to the case where xQP > 0 and xPQ = 0 is immediate, in that the
price-setter’s pro…ts ªPQ are decreasing over ° 2 [b° ; 1] ; for two reasons.
The …rst is the increase in product substitutability. As ° increases towards
one, it becomes increasingly harder for the price setting …rm to keep her
price above marginal cost. The second reason is that the quantity-setter
keeps investing in cost-reducing R&D for all ° 2 [b° ; 1).
3As anticipated in section 3.2, the only complication consists in verifying the concavity
and stability conditions, and the positivity of post innovation costs, for the asymmetric
case, together with the corresponding conditions for the symmetric cases as from Lemmata
1-2. This can only be done numerically. Calculations are available upon request.
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Claim 1 extends Singh and Vives’s …ndings to the case where …rms invest
in R&D to reduce marginal costs. The interpretation of this result is that
the lower incentive to invest that characterise a price-setter as compared to
a quantity-setter, (see Brander and Spencer, 1983; Dixon, 1985; Bester and
Petrakis, 1993), is insu¢cient to generate equilibria where at least one …rm
is a price-setter, over the whole parameter space.
Now we are in a position to compare private and social incentives con-
cerning the choice between P and Q: We know that the following holds:
Proposition 1 (Qiu, 1997, p. 223) Suppose µ 2 (0 ; 1) ; º > 1=c; and
º >
2 (2¡ µ° ¡ °2)2
(1¡ °2) (4¡ °2)2 for all ° 2 (0 ; 1) :
Then, given °; either
i] SW PP > SWQQ for all º and µ; or
ii] there exists a unique bº > 1; such that
² for all º ¸ bº and all µ 2 (0 ; 1) ; we have SW PP > SWQQ
² for all º < bº; there exists bµ 2 (0 ; 1) such that
SW PP ¡ SWQQ
> 0 for all µ < bµ
= 0 for µ = bµ
< 0 for all µ > bµ
III] For ° ! 0; [i] holds; for ° ! 1; [ii] holds.
Now, consider Claim 1 and Proposition 1 jointly. If Proposition 1[ii] holds,
and, in particular, º < bº and µ > bµ; then …rms play fQ ; Qg which is also
the socially preferred equilibrium. Therefore, we have our …nal result:
Proposition 2 Suppose
² µ 2 (0 ; 1) ; µ > bµ ;
² º 2
Ã
max
(
1
c
;
2 (2¡ µ° ¡ °2)2
(1¡ °2) (4¡ °2)2
)
; bº! for all ° 2 (0 ; 1) :
If so, fQ ; Qg is a second best equilibrium where social and private pref-
erences over the choice of the market variable coincide.
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Therefore, the introduction of an additional stage describing cost-reducing
R&D activities into Singh and Vives’s framework produces a subgame per-
fect equilibrium where, provided marginal R&D costs are su¢ciently low and
spillover are su¢ciently high, quantity setting behaviour is preferred from
both the social and the private standpoint. Obviously, there remains the
ine¢ciency associated with the pro…t-maximising decisions of …rms at the
market stage, entailing a distortion in output and price levels as compared
to the social optimum.
5 Concluding remarks
The foregoing analysis recasts the problem of the choice of the market vari-
able …rst investigated by Singh and Vives (1984) into a picture where an ad-
ditional stage describes …rms’ R&D investments in cost-reducing activities,
as in Qiu (1997). This allows us to establish that (i) …rms always choose
the Cournot behaviour; and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters
where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting.
This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while
technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the overin-
vestment in R&D associated with Cournot behaviour (Brander and Spencer,
1983) is welcome in that it produces positive welfare e¤ects, to such an ex-
tent that the con‡ict between social and private preferences over the type of
market behaviour disappears.
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